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and, albeit briefly, its connection to aj lhv qeia. 10 The main enterprise of the following paper is to examine Heidegger's interpretation of Heraclitus' description of the primordial experience of fuv v siVas a key to understanding being at the beginning of Greek thought.
As one might expect, given Heidegger's understanding of the history of be-ing in the sense glossed above, his interpretation of Heraclitus is not motivated principally by antiquarian concerns of setting the record straight. His interpretation of Heraclitus' fragments aims at understanding them not simply as the dawn of metaphysical thinking but more importantly as a way of thinking that, by stopping short of the thought of what grounds its own thinking, cannot take leave of that history. It is hardly coincidental that, for the better part of three decades beginning in the mid-1930s, Heidegger repeatedly finds inspiration and corroboration for his own thinking through reflections on Heraclitus'
fragments. 11 Although he ultimately gives a certain nod to the importance of Parmenides over that of Heraclitus, 12 Heidegger's interpretation of Heraclitus' fragments provides important clues (Winke) to what he means by the need for a new beginning of our thinking. 13 Not surprisingly, given these objectives, Heidegger reads Heraclitus' understanding offuv siVin terms of the ontological difference, such that the term 'fuv siV'
stands not for a particular being (Seiendes) or even for the set of all beings (Seiendheit), but for being itself (Sein).
14 Heidegger's interpretation of Heraclitus, it hardly needs emphasizing, is audacious, if not tendentious to a fault. After all, what Heraclitus (oJ Skoteinov V) has to say about fuv siVis not only obscure but also exasperatingly terse and, even if we indulge
Heidegger's presumptions about reading notions from other fragments as synonyms or metonyms for the term, the net result is far from conclusive evidence of anything like a 3/24/10
BeingattheBeginning 5 unified conception offuv siV.Further complicating matters is Heidegger's tendency to interpret Heraclitus in light of subsequent treatments of being.
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Of course, there is also plainly a value to the audaciousness of Heidegger's interpretive style, not only for the incentive it provides to re-examine Heraclitus' fragments in light of that interpretation, but also for the window it provides to
Heidegger's own effort to prepare for thinking that frees itself from metaphysics. The following study is undertaken with an eye to probing this potential of Heidegger's interpretation without overlooking its tendentiousness. 16 The bulk of the following essay is an attempt to reconstruct how Heidegger, on the basis of Heraclitus' fragments, interprets the experience of fuv siVas a key to the meaning of being at the beginning of Western thought. In a brief conclusion I address how this experience offuv siV supposedly underlies Plato's inauguration of metaphysics and how Heidegger's interpretation of this experience relates to his own post-metaphysical project of thinking the history of be-ing -and taking leave of it (GA 70: 21).
I. Fuv v siV as the ever-emerging self-concealment
When Heidegger observes that Plato's interpretation of the beingness of beings rests on the experience ofo[ n as fuv v siV, Heidegger has in mind the constancy and presence of beings, emerging on their own (vom ihm selbst her), where 'emerging' precisely means coming out from being closed off, concealed, and folded in upon itself (GA 55: 87). As
Heidegger puts it in another context, "fuv v siVnames that within which, from the outset, earth and sky, sea and mountains, tree and animal, human being and God emerge and, as emerging, show themselves in such a way that, in view of this, they can be named 'beings'" (GA 55: 88). Yet this formulation, he immediately warns, can be misleading if it suggests that the Greek essence offuv v siV amounts to some all-encompassing container, the result of a generalization of experiences of things emerging (e.g., seeds and blossoms). As Heidegger puts it, "the pure emerging pervades the mountains and the sea, the trees and the birds; their being itself is determined and only experienced through fuv v siVand as fuv v siV.Neither mountains nor sea nor any entity needs the 'encompassing' since, insofar as it is, it 'is' in the manner of emerging" (GA 55: 102; see, too, 89f i.e., not as any particular being or kind of being, the process of never going-under, of never passing-away or even -with suitable qualifications 19 -of constantly emerging (to; aj ei; fuv on, aj eiv zwon) constitutes, Heidegger submits, the underlying significance offuv v siV for Heraclitus. 20 Yet, even in this fragment, Heidegger emphasizes, fuv v siVis not to be understood as simply the ever-emerging. As the negative modifiers ofdu: nonindicate, the fragment presupposes the significance of "going-under" and thereby the hiddenness that is its constant companion (that is to say, not some happenstance down the road but rather a dimension integral to its emergence).
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Having thus signaled the central role played by hiddenness in Fragment 16 and identified the theme of the fragment withfuv siV, Heidegger turns to the fragment where Indeed, talk of them as two sides or two aspects is fatally misleading, insofar as it suggests either that they are (and are understandable) apart from one another or that they inhere in something or some way of being that does not entail them.
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The opposing forces responsible for the concavity and convexity of an arc or curve made by moving object may perhaps convey a sense of the contrasting mutuality signified by fuv siV.Though really distinct from one another (no mere distinctio rationis ratiocinati here), you cannot have one without the other. Each is a condition of the other and the moving arc consists of the mutual opposition (represented by its concavity and convexity) differentiating itself from a foregoing opposition. Perhaps an even more helpful image in this regard, suggested by Susan Schoenbohm, is the way that background and foreground are differentiated and thus determined in the process of perception. 29 The differentiation is both diachronic and synchronic. This differentiation is a process that differentiates itself from the foregoing undifferentiation. At the same time, foreground and background differentiate themselves in one fell swoop, allowing things in the foreground to become determinate. Because this differentiation thus takes place both diachronically and synchronically and, indeed, seemingly as a condition for the encounter of anything at all, it has the character of a fundamental, i.e., originary process. Analogously,fuv siVis at once (diachronically) the emergence from hiddenness and (synchronically) the differentiation and interplay of unhiddenness and hiddenness.
But we need not invoke our own metaphors and tropes forfuv siVhere. To round out this interpretation of the primordial, Heraclitean sense of fuv siV,
Heidegger weaves together glosses on Heraclitus' images of fire (pu: r) and adornment (kov smoV). As a fire blazes, it at once initiates and separates light from dark, pitting them against each other; so, too, the fire's flames form an expanse (the primordial "measure" splendor of the fit" of one being for one another, a fit that also enables them to be. So construed,fuv siVas kov smoVcan only refer to being not beings, again underscoring Heraclitus' appreciation of the ontological difference. "Kov smoVand pu: rsay the same,"
Heidegger contends, because, like fire, the kov smoVas the primordial adornment illuminates in one and the same event that produces the dark as light's counterpart, yet all the while is itself concealed or overlooked in favor of what has been illumined.
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II. The seeming anachronism of thinking being at the beginning
In these glosses offuv siV, particularly as kov smoV, Heidegger repeatedly contrasts this interpretation with metaphysical interpretations offuv siV (i.e., as an all-encompassing entity, entities as a whole, or even the meaning of being for entities as a whole).
Heidegger himself warns against the anachronism of reading metaphysics back into
Heraclitus' thought and insists on preserving its crucial difference from that of Plato and As noted earlier, Heidegger also invokes the ontological difference in his glosses on the fragments. 35 He exploits the fact that the fragments themselves are emphatic about the difference betweenfuv siVor any of its cognates (to; mh; du: nov n pote, aJ rmoniv a, kov smoV) and what they are said to make possible. To be sure, it is hardly patent that the difference signaled is something else, for example, a difference between a cause and its effects, i.e., between beings rather than between being and beings, Heidegger's preferred way of understanding the difference. Nevertheless, the conclusion seems inescapable that his interpretation of the Heraclitean fragments provides a much greater window into his own later thinking than it does into the thought of Heraclitus. 36 Of course, one might respond that there are levels of anachronism and, while some are plainly egregious, others are unavoidable consequences of the human condition.
As Marx puts it, "The anatomy of a human being is the key to the anatomy of an ape." phenomenon, 38 this sort of defense presupposes a linear conception of time, where the past is something denumerable that has passed away and is long gone (Vergangenes). In
Sein und Zeit
Heidegger argues that such a conception is derivative and, indeed, derivative of the temporality that provides the very meaning for human existence. Far from something that is over, the primordial sense of the past is what is always already before us, the thrownness of our finite, mortal existence that we project, one way or another. Each of us lives out this thrownness that informs all our projections and, in that sense, both overtakes us and comes to us in the form of our ending. 39 Similarly, the beginning (Anfang) of the history of Western thought is for Heidegger the inception of the event that continues to be ours (Western humanity). In language echoing the analysis of primordial temporality in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger contends that, far from something over and done so that our thinking of it is anachronistic, this beginning overtakes us and, That need, moreover, coincides with the dire straits in which we find ourselves at the end or, alternatively, at the culmination of metaphysics. Accordingly, we can come to think being at the beginning only on the basis of our own experience of this fate. Not surprisingly, towards the end of the first Heraclitus lectures, Heidegger acknowledges the necessity of having already "come into the vicinity of being, on the basis of originary
[anfängliche] experiences" in order to be able to hear "the originary terms of the originary thinking" (GA 55: 176). Following this acknowledgement, he does not directly answer the charge that he's reading his own philosophy into Heraclitus' fragments;
instead he simply shrugs it off with the observation that "if unhiddenness is grounded in a self-concealing, if this [self-concealing] is part of the essence of being itself, thenfuv siV also can never be thought in a sufficiently originary way at all" (GA 55: 176).
But to think this beginning in a way that captures its originary, inceptive dimension is to come to understand being in a way different from yet underlying the Greek beginning and its understanding of being (Sein) asfuv siV. It is, in other words, to understand be-ing (Seyn) as the historical grounding of the meaning of being and its difference from beings, i.e., as the ground that constitutes and thus appropriates to itself the essential correlation of that meaning and human understanding of it. Precisely in this connection, Heidegger proposes, recalling this first beginning amounts to thinking our way into another beginning. But, taken together with Fragment 16 ("how might someone be concealed from it?"), the observation that being cannot be produced does not mean that being is opaque to gods and humans or far from them. To the contrary, hearkening back again -albeit with a marked difference -to the language of his earlier existential analysis, Heidegger glosses the "someone" (in Fragment 16) as ek-sistent, as herself emerging and standing out into the clearing, comporting herself to the emergingfuv siVfrom which she cannot be concealed. The shift from the center of gravity in the existential analysis to that of this Heraclitus interpretation is noteworthy. In Sein und Zeit Heidegger declares that Dasein is illumined (gelichtet), but such that it is itself the clearing. In the Heraclitus lectures
Heidegger observes that the emerging someone who comports herself towards the emerging fuv siV"stands out into the clearing." This reference to the clearing and our place within it introduces the final aspect of Heidegger's reading of the Heraclitean fuv siV, namely, its relation to aj lhv qeia.Heidegger insists that Heraclitus experiences fuv siVin a way that is intimately related to the meaning of aj lhv qeia, namely, with reference to those to whom fuv siVmanifests and conceals itself. Thus, as the "primordially unifying ground," aj lhv qeiaholds sway, Heidegger contends, in the essence of fuv siVas it does in the essence of those -Gods and humans -who correspond to fuv siVby way of unconcealing (entbergend) and by opening themselves up (Sicheröffnen)(GA 55: 173f). Heidegger makes no pretense here that
Heraclitus explicitly says as much; it also remains unsaid, Heidegger adds, by
Anaximander and Parmenides. But he regards the fact that it is not said as anything but a strike against his interpretation. The fact thataj lhv qeia,as he interprets it, remains unsaid signals that it is the phenomenon "from which or on the basis of which the thinking at the beginning speaks" (aus dem her das anfängliche Denken spricht) (GA 55: 174).
Heidegger finds particular confirmation of this signal in his readings of Fragments 16 and 123. While Fragment 16, it may be recalled, is ostensibly aboutfuv siVon Heidegger's reading, the depiction of it as the ever-emerging or, more precisely, "never going-under" and the plaintive question: "Who can hide from this?" clearly trade on the sense ofaj lhv qeiaas unhiddenness. However, just as it would be a mistake -an ontotheological mistake -to understand fuv siVhere as some entity (Seiendes) or even beings as a whole (das Seiende im ganzen) constantly on hand, apart from Dasein, so, too, it would be a mistake -an alethiotheological mistake -to understand aj lhv qeiahere (fuv siV kruv ptesqai filei:), as noted above. So, too, contrary to (b), Heraclitus himself emphasizes that no one can hide from it. Accordingly, since"aj lhv qeiais, as the name says, not pure openness but the unconcealment of the self-concealing," it is the name for "the essential beginning offuv siVitself and the gods and humans belonging to it" (GA 55:
175). Thus, if the experience of being at the beginning is the experience of fuv siV (genitivus objectivus), it is no less the experience of aj lhv qeia(genitivus appositivus).
Conclusion: fromfuv siV toij dev a
How,onHeidegger'sview,doesPlatotakeupbutfundamentallytransform another level he re-interprets being in terms of the ij dev a that illuminates things, enabling them to be seeable and thus to be. 42 The primordial significance of aj lhv qeiagives way to 3/24/10
BeingattheBeginning 19 the ij dev a as something always unhidden relative to ij dei: n, a perceiving, albeit in the sense of noei: n, qewrei: n. Through this subordination of aj lhv qeiato the ij dev a, it devolves into the alignment (oJ moiv wsiV) of something perceived with a perceiver and, ultimately, the correctness of an assertion about them. By way of conclusion, I shall try to put some flesh on these bare-boned claims.
In Heidegger's 1931/32 lectures on Plato, he emphasizes that the Platonicij dev ais reducible neither to the particular being it illuminates (the object perceived) nor to the subject who perceives thanks to its illumination. 43 Exploiting the analogy that Plato himself draws between fw: V andij dev a, Heidegger construes the idea as what, like light,
lets us see what an entity is, "allowing it, as it were, to come to us." 44 But the ideas can "let things through" only thanks to being seen in some way themselves. In these lectures in the Cave Allegory as in the Beiträge, Heidegger adds that Plato's tendency to construeaj lhv qeiain terms of light is part and parcel of his obliviousness to hiddenness supposed by it: "And because theaj lhv qeiathus becomesfw: V,the character of the a-privative also gets lost" (GA 65: 332/CPh 233).
Heidegger also locates the onset of the transformation of truth into correctness in Plato's account ofaj lhv qeiain terms of the illuminatingij dev a. Insofar as beings can be seen -and thus can be said to be -thanks to theij dev a, "the brightness of theij dev ais the yoke,sugov nalthough characteristically this is never articulated" (GA 65: 335/CPh 234f).
Plato construes truth, at least sometimes, with the way the brightnesss of theij dev ayokes subject and object. In this way he subordinatesaj lhv qeiato theij dev a-the fatal move that forfeits the primordial sense of aj lhv qeia, epitomized by the Heracliteanfuv siV, and opens the way to conceiving truth as the correspondence between subject and object, perception and perceiver, sentence and its reference. "For Plato ij dev amoves aboveaj lhv qeiabecause the seeability [Sichtsamkeit] becomes essential forij dei: n (yuv ch) and not the unconcealing as pre-vailing of be-ing [Wesung des Seyns]" (GA 34: 99n2/ET 84n2). 47 As noted above, the other signal of Plato's departure from Heraclitus in Heidegger's eyes is Plato's confinement of the discussion of aj lhv qeiato the realm of beings, indeed, to such an extent that theij dev a is itself a particular being. in these passages, Heidegger is working to ward off three misinterpretations, two based in "normal thinking" and a third inspired by Hegel. Normal thinking may (1) simply dismiss the fragment as "illogical," given its formal contradictoriness, or (2) construe the relation between "going-up" and "going-under" as two temporally distinct and thus noncontradictory processes. Finally, "speculative" thinking, having determined "the selfcontradictory precisely to be 'the true'," (3) resolves the contradiction dialectically into a unity. In Heidegger's view, this dialectical approach avoids the effort to think what the fragment says and, instead, has recourse anachronistically to the "method of a late metaphysics" (GA 55: 112, 126f). interpretation offuv siV as fire: (1) insofar as a fire, e.g., a campfire, provides light to see one another in the midst of the darkness, we may ignore the fire in order to attend to the presences and absences it makes possible; (2) insofar as, gazing at a fire, we see the coals and embers glowing and darkening in a regular rhythm, taking on different shapes before disappearing into the flames, we see not the fire itself but something on fire; in this sense, the fire may be said to conceal itself in the process. 33 In making the latter point about the obliviousness to the adornment, Heidegger distinguishes the foreground adorned things (das Gezierde) from the original adorning (das Zieren) of the pure, but unapparent fit underlying them; see GA 55: 163-66; VS 20f/FS 7f.
